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NOTES AND COMMENT
VALIDITY OF ISSUANCE OF No PAR STOCK FOR PROPERTY
AND SERVICES.
The transformation of the small, closely-held personal business
into widely-held and loosely-governed corporate organizations has
brought the question of corporate control into significant prominence."
Disregarding a varied history of public antipathy towards corporate
power, the President of the United States hails the dawn of the age
of legalized monopoly, seeing increased prosperity as a direct result.2
Men of vision, however, have long ago sounded the tocsins of alarm
and continue to publicize the ruthless extinction of individual rights.3
Among the egregious devices utilized to further disfranchise the pub-
lic is that of no par stock.4 Issuing stock without par value for prop-
erty or services is particularly open to abuse and the legal conse-
quences are deservant of analysis.
That no par stock is here to stay is very evident when one exam-
ines the bankers' circular on the financial sheets of newspapers. The
majority of new stock issues in recent years carries the no par stock
feature.5 Canada and nearly all of the states of the Union possess
statutes permitting the use of no par stock,6 which, of itself, is con-
vincing of its general utilization. The no par stock provisions of
these various states have been classified and seem to follow two main
lines of division,7 the majority following the liberal Delaware form
'William Z. Ripley v. Main Street and Wall Street (1927).
' President Hoover, in an address before the American Legion Convention,
1930, stated, "that we might be better off without anti-trust laws and that we
would have more prosperity under monopoly than under competition."
'Woodrow Wilson, American Bar Association Review (1910), p. 439,
addressing the A. B. A. convention: "The present task of the law is to rehabili-
tate the individual. * * * I regard the corporation as indispensable to modern
business enterprise. * ** My purpose is to recall you to the service of the
nation as a whole. You are not the servants of the special interests, the expert
counsellors of this, that, or any other group of business men, but guardians of
the general place, the guide of those who seek to realize by some best accom-
modation the right of men. I am asking you to look again at the corporation."
Also Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance (1928), ch. IV; Rob-
bins, No Par Stock (1927), 88.
"Supra Note 1 at 46: "An egregious malversation of the rights of the
stockholders and of the rights of the public generally is the device of no par
stock."
'Financial Chronicle (1926) lists over 500 corporations using this novel
stock device.
'Wildman and Powell, Capital Stock Without Par Value (1928), 70;
Thompson, Corporation, sec. 3918.
" Bonbright, The Danger Of Shares Without Par Value (1924), 24 Col.
L. Rev. 449, at 458: " * * * we may divide the laws into two types-the
Delaware type, followed by the large majority of the states, and the New York
type adopted by New York and California. Their chief difference is that the
former makes no provision as to the stated capital with which a corporation
will carry on business, whereas the latter does make such a provision.
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of legislation,8 the minority, the statutes of New York.9 Other forms
also exist.' 0
Although at first blush the differences between the Delaware and
New York statutes are not of a startling nature, it is diverse enough
to cause considerable variation in liabilities. The tenor of the New
York law suggests that the consideration received for no par stock
ought to be stated in terms of value." This requirement, though said
to be desirable, is ambiguous, and thus far there has been no decision
in point. Bonbright points out that if the New York court decides
that no value need be stated, then the effect of the New York law is
identical with that of Delaware.1
2
A frequent critique leveled at this new feature in corporate
finance is that it leaves the door for fraud wide open. It was early
observed that little, if any, liability arises when one issues no par
stock for insufficient consideration. 13 Furthermore, new stockholders
'Delaware General Corp. Law (1929), sec. 4a: "For such stock (no par)
may be issued from time to time for such consideration as may be fixed by the
board of directors pursuant to authority conferred in the certificate of incor-
poration or amendment thereto or * * * by the consent of the holders of two-
thirds of each class of stock outstanding, given at a meeting called for that
purpose.
N. Y. Stock Corp. Law, sec. 12: "A. The capital of the corporation shall
be at least equal to the sum of the aggregate par value of all issued shares
having par value plus * * * dollars in respect to every issued share without
par value, plus such amounts as, from time to time, by resolution of the board
of directors, may be transferred thereto, or, stated value of no par stock.
B. The capital of the corporation shall at least be equal to the sum of the
aggregate par value of all issued shares having par value, plus the aggregate
amount of consideration received by the corporation for the issuance of shares
without par value, plus such amounts as, from time to time, by resolution of
the board of directors, may be transferred thereto." (True no par stock.)
"°Wickersham, Stock Without Par Value (1928), 128, summarizes the
statutory provisions into four categories as follows:
I. Arbitrary stated value as in Illinois.
II. Amount received for the stock (Ind., Conn., La., Ohio, Md.. Minn.
and Nev.).
III. Amount required to begin business:
(a) stated capital represented by no par shares with additions
or deductions (Pa., Md.. N. Mex., Me., Vt.).(b) capitalized (Me., Vt.).
IV. Actual net assets (Idaho).
11 N. Y. S. C. L., sec. 12: "All corporations other than moneyed corpora-
tions may issue stock without par value (a) for such consideration as may be
prescribed in the charter, (b) for such consideration as shall be the fair
market value of such shares * * *, (c) for such consideration as the directors
may fix, (d) for such consideration as may be approved by a majority of the
holders of the voting shares."
"
2 Supra op. cit. Note 7.
" Cook, Stock Without Par Value (1921). 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583; see
7 Amer. B. A. Journal 534; Reed, Corporation Finance (1927), p. 8; Pierson,
Shares Having No Par Value, 17 Ill. L. Rev. 179.
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of a concern may obtain the same rights and privileges at a cost
grossly less than that paid by existing stockholders to the latter's
consequent loss.1 4  Since existing stockholders are presumably ac-
quainted with the characteristics of their holdings, to say, therefore,
there is no fraud is an ingenious argument, 15 but of little succor to
the inequities of the situation. Of even more potent significance is the
concurrent facilitation of the control of property rights by the cor-
porate management, when the no par stock is issued for property or
services. With the advent of this device, directors and promoters are
with great ease able to secure a strangle-hold on the future profits of
any going concern by brazenly issuing a block of stock for imaginary
services or fictitiously valued property.16 The lack of adequate legal
restraints suggests a most profitable field for nefarious directorates
and simultaneously points at the helpless predicament of shareholders.
In this we are not concerned with the validity of stock issued to a
subscriber of stated value no par shares, 1 7 nor with the viewpoint of
the speculator or of the perpetrator of prima facie fraud. The law is
settled in those situations. But as concerns the validity of the issu-
ance of no par stock for property and services, the law is still in a
state of flux.
As preliminary safeguards ordinarily the good faith and true
value rules have been regarded as a basis for imposing liability when
stock was issued for property. But with the advent of no par stock
these rules are difficult of application for it is prinia facie issued as
fully paid and non-assessable 18 and the surest way of avoiding lia-
bility is to avoid mentioning monetary value.' 9 In New York the
discretion of the directorate determines whether the same considera-
tion be maintained for all no par stock issued at the same time.2 0
At best this is a risky safeguard even though at all times they must
act in the interests of the stockholders. 2 1
"Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance (1928), p. 72; Hodg-
man v. Atlantic Refining Co., 13 F. (2nd) 781 (C. C. A., 3rd, 1926): "Simul-
taneous issue at different prices is not illegal in the absence of statutes to
the contrary."W Cassius Clay, Shares Without Par Value (May, 1925), 13 Ky. L. Rev.
278, points out: "There can be no fraud on existing stockholders, strictly
speaking, for when new shares for less than the usual considerations is issued,
the existing stockholders should have known all the time that such things
might happen."
" For a searching and analytical discussion of no par stock see Berle,
Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance (1928), ch. IV.
"
T It is generally conceded that stated value no par stock will easily be
governed by par stock principles.
'
8 Supra Note 8.
"Bonbright, sucpra Notes 7, 11, states, "A valid agreement of stock sub-
scription is made out by the transfer of 'x properties' or 'a dead cat and yellow
dog,' for a block of no par shares." The subscriber has thus paid all he has
agreed to contribute and so he has no additional liability.
' N. Y. S. C. L.. supra Note 11; see Stone v. Young, 206 N. Y. Supp. 95
210 App. Div. 203, (1924), it was held that no par shares could not be issued
as a pure bonus, and that in any case there must be consideration.
-" Berle, Supra Note 14 at 51 et seq.
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Being exposed to such risks, what then are the remedies that
either law or equity will afford? The relief afforded the divers classes
of interests involved after a violation of the stock statutes may be
classified as follows: 22
1. The corporation of itself has no remedy if the existing
stockholders assented to the transaction, even though the only stock-
holders at that time all connived to profit at the expense of future
subscribers.. Nearly all jurisdictions allow an innocent stockholder
maximum protection if his consent was not obtained, by allowing a
cancellation of his subscription. It has been suggested that the issue
is not void but should be declared invalid only as to the over-valued
shares, because to do otherwise would be unfair to an innocent stock-
holder who bought his shares at less than nominal value. 23
2. The original subscriber's transferee with notice of the tran-
saction, or having means to obtain information is in no better position
than his transferor. However, it has been held that the corporation in
attempting to collect an assessment from an innocent purchaser of
fully paid and non-assessable stock will not be upheld for the reason
that, as between both parties the innocent purchaser deserves protec-
tion since his culpability and negligence is less than that of the
corporation.
3. There is also to be considered the right of the innocent
creditor. His position may be summarily dismissed by noting that
under the present state of the law in regard to no par stock cor-
porations, little, if any, relief is accorded him. Actions by creditors
against corporations or against promoters whose pockets are lined
with corporate funds are futile.24
The procedure of the promoter is either to get a majority of the
stock or sometimes all of the authorized issue in exchange for some
property or service of doubtful value. Suits against promoters for
secret profits have been the most frequent manifestation in the
tribunals of the presence of this problem of the validity of issued no
par stock. How far the courts will go in upholding its validity is
usually seen in a suit by the corporation or by stockholders as indi-
viduals against promoters who allegedly have made big profits. True,
the body of rules evolved from this litigation pertain to par stock.
Yet in the light of some decisions there should be no distinction
dependent upon whether no par or par stock was used, regarding the
trustworthiness of organizers. 25 Because of the fiduciary relation
-Ballentine, Private Corporations (1927), ch. XVI.
'Berle, supra Note 16 at 88; also Note, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 757.
' Robbins, No Par Stock (1927), p. 100 et seq.; Ballentine, supra Note 22
at 690; sec. 70, N. Y. Stock Corporation Law, imposes liability upon creditors
but no decision as yet has held, that it applies to no par stock.
'Smith v. General Motor Corp., 289 Fed. 205 (C. C. A., Mich., 1923):
"* * * a subscription to original stock at a definite par value and subscription
to an issue of increased no par stock at a fixed price seem to depend upon the
same principles"; Berle, supra Note 16 at 75.
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that the promoter, whose position is of vital importance, nowadays,
assumes toward the corporation which he is organzing, a full dis-
closure of his act must be made.20 With the corporation as a plaintiff
there can be no recovery if there has been full disclosure, for there
then can be no corporate injury. Disclosure, therefore, is of para-
mount importance, especially so where the organizers take all the
capital stock for property.27
Two extremely important cases involving millions of dollars
gave new views and restated settled rules. In Old Dominion Copper
Co. v. Bigelow28 non-disclosure, even to those later original sub-
scribers, was declared to be the basis for fraud. Its companion case,
Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 29 arising out of the same
facts but tried in the United States Supreme Court, refused to allow
recovery. Holmes, J., bases the Court's conclusion on, first, the fact
that there was full disclosure to all subscribers at the time of the
sale, and, second, to allow recovery would lead to inequitable results.
Although it has been suggested that the Lewisohn case has in effect
been overruled by Davis v. Las Ovas Co., and "to have removed the
ratio decidendi of the Lewisohn decision," 30 recent cases indicate
that the latter rule is still in its pristine effect. 31
New Jersey has been a strong adherent of the Bigelow case and,
in fact stoutly maintains that it continues to be. Recently in Piggly
Wiggly, Delaware v. Bartlett, 32 the Court held that there may be no
recovery against a promoter who obtained the entire issue of no par
value stock in exchange for an option worth $1,000. The stock was
subsequently sold by him to the public without any disclosure as to
how the transaction occurred. The sale netted the promoter a clean
$48,000. The basis of this startling decision was that the 15,000
shares of no par common stock at the time of its issuance to the
promoter was worth no more than the property he conveyed to the
corporation. Hence, no over-valuation and therefore no liability. Of
course, if there is no over-valuation there cannot be a profit nor a
recovery. This is a frequent delimiting factor that prohibits pro-
moters' liability. -Unfortunately Piggly Wiggly, Delaware v. Bartlett
indicates another loophole that would release the promoter from
delivering up his lucre, since the courts refuse to allow justice when
'See Berle, Bankers and Promoters Stock Profits (1929). 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 751.
Ballentine, supra Note 22 at 166 et seq.
188 Mass. 315, 74 N. E. 653 (1905).
:210 U. S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L. ed. 1025 (1907).
(1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 447, 451; Ehrich, Promoters, sec. 140.
M See Henderson case, infra Note 36 at 217, for authorities.
SPiggly Wiggly, Delaware v. Bartlett, 97 N. J. Eq. 469, 129 Atl.
413 (1925).
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no par stock has been the device used. This attitude of the court has
been regarded as unsound and has justly been vigorously denounced a3
Following on its heels, came the case of Allenhurst Park Estates
v. Smith 34 which reiterates the attitude of the Piggly Wiggly decision
and deals a deathblow to the hopes of those who waited a change of
position. The corporation sued the promoters for an injunction and
for secret profits, setting up that 3,000 shares, the entire outstanding
issue, was presented to defendants for insufficient consideration, in
return for an option on some property. Nothing was paid on the
option by the promoters out of their own money but only out of
money subscribed to share capital. Held, relief denied, although the
defendants are fiduciaries and are under the burden of proving that
their dealings are fair and honest, they need not so do here. The
promoters were given a clean bill of health, since, first, they had been
real subscribers to all the stocks; second, secured ratification of all
their acts; and, third, had disclosed all material facts to the original
subscribers.
But what is of more importance, the Court refused to allow the
par stock cases, involving the issuance of bonus stock, to govern on
the question of consideration when no par stock was utilized. Argu-
ing further, it asserts that giving away the entire outstanding stock
for far-fetched promoters' services is merely just compensation. The
decision is full of similar provoking statements and stretches several
points in order to justify the conduct of the promoters without whom
"much of the material success and industrial progress of this country
would not have been attained." 35 The Court seems to seize upon the
devices of no par stock, and word jugglery, in order to avoid what is
considered a vacuous doctrine of "judge-made law wherein the pro-
moter is restrained from enjoying his legitimate profit or reaping the
honest rewards of his labor." To do that, the decision asserts, would
make the courts an instrument of fraud, but it seems to forget the
similarly equitable duty in maintaining the rights of innocent stock-
holders and to safeguard the corporation capital. Not long ago the
position of the New Jersey court was strengthened by Henderson v.
Plymouth Oil Co.36 where the promoters were given even greater
leeway. After a scholarly review of the authorities, the decision
asserts that the Bigelow case is by far the minority. However, the
strong minority opinion of Harrington, J., bolsters the legal implica-
tions of the Bigelow case and points out its desirability.
'Supra Note 24 at 88: "No par stock may have been designed originally
to protect investors, but the Bartlett decision is conclusive proof that under
the present laws the removal of par value denies investors an important legal
protection." For an excellent discussion of the Bartlett case, see Note (1926)
26 Col. L. Rev. 447.
' Allenhurst Park Estates v. Smith, 101 N. J. Eq. 581, 138 Ati. 709
(1927).
Supra Note 34 at 716.
Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co. (Del. Ch., 1928), 141 Atl. 197.
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In the Allenhurst case the Court distinguishes it from the facts
in the Bartlett case since there was no sale of stock in the former.37
Yet the ratio decidendi of these cases would indicate that the instru-
ment of no par stock has been used as a means of evading liability.
It is hopeful to note, however, that authorities are beginning to com-
prehend the situation and that by a continuing attack will cause the
discarding of the present view of non-imposition of any restraints in
issuing no par stock for property or services.
To prevent the Bartlett case and such similar swindles, the fol-
lowing suggestions have been presented by a clear-thinking student
of the problem: 38
1. That the prices must be agreed upon as a means of valua-
tion, and is really necessary to give effect to the law.
2. If no such standard is bad, at least the old good faith and
true value rules should apply.
3. There may be a provision that no share be issued at less
than its market value. Perhaps it would be well to follow
the old Massachusetts rule that the commissioner of se-
curities must be sure that the stocks issued for property is
reasonable.3 9
4. The stockholder should be given the right of independent
appraisal if they are not sure directors' valuations are fair.
The same author has elsewhere 40 gone further is enunciating a
theory opined by the best legal authorities by stating that no par
shares cannot be issued at whatever price the directors desire but
that the price of all other issues other than the first would be limited
by a court of equity. This equitable minimum issue price, as he dubs
it, is the lowest amount at which a share of stock may be issued with-
out prejudice to the equality of the old shareholders and will depend
upon the circumstances of the case. Then follows the Minimum Issue
Price Rule stating no share of stock may be issued at less than,
(a) its par value if the stock has a par value, (b) its stated value in
case of a stated value no par share, (c) its equitable minimum in any
case.4 1 It is submitted that to extend this beneficial rule to stock
originally issued would go a long way in preventing the abuses
attending the no par feature.
Various proposed reforms suggested are:
1. The use of the Blue Sky Laws, 42 so that the commissions
would prevent fraud in the distribution of securities. This
Supra Note 34 at 715.
Robbins, supra Note 24 at 128.
Mass. Stat. (1875), ch. 177, sec. 2.
LMontgomery, Financial Handbook (1925), 1629.
4 Robbins, supra Note 40 at 1630, restates the rule: "The equitable minimum
is the highest price at which the particular shares may be issued in the open
market for such shares."
42 Ballentine, supra Note 22 at 832 et seq.
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unfortunately seems useless in the light of the usual in-
effectiveness of these commissions.
2. That a public registry be required for all issues of stock,
having a sworn statement of the amount paid for the
property. This is at present done in Germany and had
been followed in England since 1867.43
3. It has been suggested,44 "Any share of non-par stock may
be issued for payment of money or in exchange for prop-
erty or rights which the company may hold or for services
rendered by providing a certificate setting forth the num-
ber of shares in question, the amount paid thereon, and
describing with reasonable definiteness the property, rights,
or services, accepted in payment thereof, prior to the issue
thereof, executed, acknowledged, and reported as part of
the charter. No share of stock shall be issued until such
recording and so forth is done. This original certificate
may be amended by a new certificate, issued, executed,
and so forth in like manner as the original certificate."
This would at least put subscribers in a position to become
familiar with the status of the corporation.
4. California has a unique way of dealing with the situation
by penalizing the stock brokers engaged in shady transac-
tions.45 This, of course, also suggests the fact that the
Stock Exchanges could help the situation along by super-
vising and making public these transgressions.
In conclusion, as soon as this means of swindling the investor is
made public knowledge (and there is ample evidence to the effect
that the courts and the corporation authorities are becoming wiser)
a reaction will take place. The Bartlett and Allenhurst cases, instead
of being taken as evidence of the fact that the courts refuse to recog-
nize the rights of the stockholder as against the grabbing promoter.
should be viewed in a more hopeful light. These cases will eventually
prove to the judges the danger of the use of no par stock when issued
for services and property. It should lead to, first, a series of decisions
restricting the promoters in their actions, and, second, stringent laws
putting the evaluation of consideration received for stock, whether par
or no par, on a more substantial basis.
WILLIAM H. SHAPIRO.
Meeker, Preventive and Primitive Security Laws (1926), 26 Col. L.
Rev. 318 at 327.
"Machen, 1920 Corporation Reports 16.
"List v. Republic Bond & Mortgage Co., 271 Pac. 529 (1928).
